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Abstract. Risk analysis is a vital step in the succession of construction projects. However, no adequate researches have been 
conducted to assess, and quantify risk events in real estate projects in developing countries, and particularly in Egypt.This re-
search recommends Fuzzy Quantitative Risk Assessment Model to quantify risk factors participated in real estate development 
projects. Model is composed of two components: 1) Fuzzy Fault Tree (FT) that determines root causes of each risk, probability 
of its occurrence, and probability of mitigation strategies failure; and 2) Fuzzy Event Tree (ET) that calculates crisp value of 
Expected Monetary Value (EMV) of allowance of mitigation of the identified risks. Causes of risk are determined through 
literature review and interviews with experts in field. Risk probability occurrence is determined using five linguistic terms, 
defined either triangular or trapezoidal membership functions which are developed using modified horizontal approach and 
an interpolation technique. Two-step Delphi technique is used to achieve consensus on the root causes and logical representa-
tion of the Fault Tree. Fuzzy importance analysis is performed to rank different root causes for identified risks according to 
their criticality to probability of occurrence. A Case Study is presented to evaluate results obtained from model, in terms of 
Expected Monetary Value (EMV), and fuzzy probability of failure for each risk participated in case study.
Keywords: risk management, fuzzy sets, fault tree, event tree, real estate development projects, mitigation strategy, Egypt.
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Introduction
Risk management can be described as an essential pro-
cess in establishment of real estate construction projects, 
which may have an impact on construction industry as 
a whole. Real estate industry plays a crucial role in rais-
ing national income and solving social problems in both 
developed and developing countries. In 2011, it con-
tributed with almost 5% to US Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). This figure is less the peak of 2006, which is 8.9% 
of the GDP (Approximately $1.195 trillion). Real estate 
construction industry is labour intensive. As such, any 
decline in residential construction contributes to reces-
sion’s high unemployment rate (Amadeo, 2012). Moreo-
ver, it plays an essential role in flourishing economies of 
developing countries. In a developing country like Egypt, 
the real estate construction industry contributes to the 
Egyptian Government Budget with 2.83 percent from the 
Egyptian national income (Alexandria Bank Economic 
Research, 2012). Moreover, real estate projects differ 
from other types of construction projects because they 
are considered the riskiest construction project since 
they require from developer to pay large amount of capi-
tal in the form of purchasing land. Also, they are consid-
ered as long-term investment project. The owner profit 
will be achieved at the end of the projects when units 
are sold. Therefore, real estate projects are characterized 
as negative cash flow project because of owner continu-
ous payment. Due to high levels of risk and uncertainty 
associated with the Real Estate Construction Industry, 
project teams in real estate projects need to assess risk 
events encountered in their projects in order to elimi-
nate vagueness, imprecision, and unavailable data and 
information. Moreover, when risk events are expected, 
project team members compute the price of real estate 
projects at different scenarios. This can be done using the 
expected monetary value (EMV) which provides project 
teams with a method to calculate the cost of the project 
if one risk event or many risk events occur. Also, due 
to current political and economic hard situations facing 
these projects after Egyptian Revolution in 2011 affected 
real estate construction industry immensely. Thus, due 
to in existence of adequate risk analysis in real estate 
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construction projects in Egypt, economic difficulties 
that encountered in real estate development projects after 
2011 revolution, and the instability in markets prices due 
to increase in the cost of purchasing equipment, materi-
als, and continuous devaluation of local currency against 
foreign currency, the real estate project teams want to 
evaluate risks in projects to produce a prioritized list of 
risks, which help them addressing vagueness and im-
precision that they are currently facing. The assessment 
methodology can be changed and applied to different 
types of construction projects by changing risk events, 
and expert judgment.
1. Literature review
PMI (2008) defined project risk management cycle as “the 
cycle of identifying, qualifying, quantifying, and planning 
response risks.” Different researches have tackled quali-
tative risk assessment. KarimiAzari, Mousavi, Mousavi, 
and Hosseini (2011) have analysed risk models using 
matrix method to select construction projects. Moreover, 
Foong and Nordin (2010) used Risk Assessment Matrix 
to assist engineers in reducing safety, environmental, and 
economic impacts of risk hazards. Also, Markowski and 
Mannan (2008) studied Fuzzy Risk Matrix. The research 
described a methodology for development of fuzzy matrix 
to decrease the number of accidents using different sce-
narios. Another study, was performed by Robert (2004) 
that described a 3-dimensional approach to qualify risks, 
where first axis represents possibility of occurrence of risk, 
second axis represents possibility of consequence, and 
third axis represents level of consequence. On the opposite 
side, in literature, different methods have been applied to 
quantify risks events. Kangari and Riggs (1989) organized 
methods into two main groups: the first is classical models 
(Probability models); and the second is subjective models, 
such as fuzzy set method. Quantitative analysis for risk 
management problem contains determining certain avail-
able failure of the system, and consequence to decrease 
failure probabilities of system components and loses, re-
spectively (Kangari & Riggs, 1989). Selecting optional de-
cision alternatives is developed to reduce risk events or 
expected loss (Al-Bahar & Crandall, 1990). Several tech-
niques have been adopted to perform quantitative analysis 
including; decision trees, neural networks, Monte Carlo 
Simulation, and fuzzy logic.
Levner, Ganoulis, Linlov, and Benayahu (2007) stud-
ied multi objective assessment of risks for artificial marine 
system using fuzzy decision trees estimation. However, it 
is should be mentioned here that decision trees are in-
capable of computing accurate probability values unless 
historical data exist, which is not available in our case at 
hand. Further, they neither provide a methodology for de-
tecting critical risk events nor define a clear sequence for 
root causes identification associated with risk events. Ma-
ria-Sanchez (2005) quantified risk events in terms of costs 
in construction projects using neural networks. The most 
common risks in infrastructure projects were identified 
and analysed to evaluate risk impacts to contractor’s profit. 
Al-Sobiei, Arditi, and Polat (2005) designed a model to 
predict contractors’ default risks in Saudi Arabia using ar-
tificial neural network (ANN) and genetic algorithm tech-
niques. Angelini, Giacomo, and Roli (2008) studied credit 
risk evaluation using neural network approach. In spite 
of fact that neural networks need historical data, neural 
network lack ability to explain logic behind how model is 
applied to produce outputs. Further, neural networks lack 
ability to include mitigation strategies in risk assessment. 
On the other hand, Monte Carlo Simulation was either 
integrated with fuzzy logic to study risk assessment in 
construction (Sadeghi, Fayek, & Pedrycz, 2010) or used 
to compute the consequence of a cash flow hazards on 
project success (Javid & Seneviratne, 2000). Nevertheless, 
Monte Carlo Simulation lacks the ability to identify causes 
of risk events. Also, the results obtained from Monte Carlo 
Simulation are wide in range.
Fuzzy logic had been first recommended by Zadeh 
(1965). Subsequently, a lot of research efforts have been 
carried using fuzzy logic. A. Chan, D. Chan, and Yeung 
(2009) presented a model describing “Fuzzy Techniques” 
in Construction Management Assessment. Markowski, 
Mannan, and Bigoszewska (2009) proposed a methodol-
ogy to implement fuzzy risk matrix that is suitable for 
safety analysis. Shaheen, Fayek, and AbouRizk (2007) 
developed model to estimate range in cost. It is worth 
noting that Fuzzy-Logic method cannot provide a clear 
methodology for computing the Expected Monetary Val-
ue of a risk event. Further, effect of development of miti-
gation strategies is not considered by the Fuzzy-Logic 
method, which could be better dealt with using fault and 
event tree analysis. NASA (2002) provided a definition 
for FT as “a graphical diagram of different parallel and 
successive combinations of faults that may lead to unde-
sired event existence”. FT has been applied in different 
applications including; Construction Dispute Negotia-
tion Failure (Yiu, Cheung, & Lok, 2015), prediction of 
oil and gas pipeline failure probability (Yuhua & Datao, 
2005), reliability analysis of solar array (Wu, Yan, & Xie, 
2011), and recognition of nuclear power plant systems 
failure (Abdelhai, 1993).
Tyagi, Pandey, and Kumar (2011) studied fuzzy FT 
analysis for fault diagnosis in power transformer using 
beta distribution. Abdelgawad and Fayek (2011) exam-
ined quantitative risk events using fuzzy fault tree analysis. 
They used subjective terms to analyse risks probability of 
occurrence. Their proposed approach offers the risk coor-
dinators the ability to rank events according to probability 
of risk event. Song, Zhang, and Chan (2009) proposed a 
fuzzy FT assessment based on Takagi and Sugeno model 
with application to navigate the system.
Real estate project developers face difficulties in eval-
uating risks associated with their projects. They indeed 
need to compute bidding price and EMV of each risk 
to accommodate impacts of risk. This article proposes 
fuzzy quantitative risk analysis model, which combines 
fuzzy FT and ET assessment to analyse risks in real estate 
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development projects. Model assists real estate developers 
in identifying critical causes of risk events and conducting 
fuzzy importance analysis on fault trees. Also, it assists in 
determining the actual cost of mitigation strategy if risk 
event occurs by computing EMV of each risk, using ET 
analysis. Model improves over previous quantitative risk 
management models by computing the actual cost of the 
mitigation strategy of each risk event.
2. Research methodology
The methodology of developing the fuzzy quantitative risk 
analysis model is depicted in Figure 1. These stages are 




 Collect root 
 Establish linguistic terms to assess probability  
Conduct qualitative risk analysis using fault tree  
 Develop Boolean matrix 
 Develop working Boolean matrix 
 Conduct analysis 
Conduct quantitative risk analysis using fault tree 
 Represent each linguistic term using α–cuts 
 Represent the top event fuzzy probability using 
minimum cut set 
 Conduct fuzzy arithmetic operations 
 Defuzzify the top event using the mean of 
maximum  
 Conduct fuzzy importance analysis 
Conduct fuzzy fault tree analysis using mitigation 
strategy 
 Compute fuzzy probability of mitigation strategies 
 Conduct fuzzy importance analysis to select the 
most suitable mitigation strategy 
Conduct event tree analysis 
 Compute consequence of paths  
 Assess overall probability of each path 
 Compute the expected risk magnitude (ERM) of 
each path 
 Compute the expected monetary value (EMV)  
 Use the mean of maximum method to obtain a crisp 
value of risk event  
Validate via case study 
Figure 1. Methodology and model development
2.1. Data collection
This stage is divided into two steps; collect root causes for 
each critical risk event existed in Real Estate Development 
Projects, and establish linguistic terms of these critical risk 
events. Collect root causes step is concerned with defining 
the root causes for each critical risk event and mitigation 
strategies failure using various techniques, such as inter-
views, Delphi, brain storming and check list. In this mod-
el, literature review and interviews with fifteen experts in 
real estate development projects were conducted using in-
direct method. The two-step Delphi technique was used 
to achieve consensus among experts. Establish linguistic 
term step is concerned with assessing probability of occur-
rence of critical risks. Fuzzy linguistic terms are defined 
using interviews with fifteen experts. Experts have pre-
vious experience of more than twenty years in both real 
estate development projects, and risk assessment. Experts 
agreed to have five-point scale which range from Very Low 
(VL) to Very High (VH) in order to compute probability 
of occurrence for each risk. Experts were then asked to 
develop membership function for each linguistic term. 
Modified horizontal approach with interpolation tech-
nique was used to develop membership function (MF). 
Process of developing MF of input and output variables 
determines shapes of MF for both input and output vari-
ables using modified horizontal approach (Hauptmanns, 
1988; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Khan & Abbasi, 1999; Javid 
& Seneviratne, 2000; Maria-Sanchez, 2005; Levner et al., 
2007; Markowski, Mannan, & Bigoszewska, 2009; Marsh 
& Fayek, 2010, Elbarkouky & Fayek, 2011). Detailed pro-
cess of constructing membership functions using modi-
fied horizontal approach with interpolation is explained 
in Aboushady (2012).
2.2. Conducting qualitative fault tree analysis
This stage assesses basic events fuzzy probability of oc-
currence resulted from Stage 1, and identifies the mini-
mal cut sets (MCS). Ayyub (2013) defined MCS as “MCS 
with condition that basic event non-occurrence from this 
set may result in top event non-occurrence.” To illustrate 
computation of the MCS using Hauptmanns’ (1988) algo-
rithm, Figure 3 illustrates the FT structure that captures 
the failure of financial system as a top event (TE). TE is 
connected with three gate events using OR gate which are; 
increase in interest rate (GE1), increase in Taxes (GE2), 
and inflation (GE3). Each gate event is connected with a 
list of basic events. The first stage in qualitative FT analysis 
to convert FT structure into Boolean matrix abbreviated 
as (BM), which is composed of 0 and 1 to represent no 
connection or existing connection, respectively. Table S1 
(supplementary material) lists Boolean Matrix (BM) for 
illustrative example of FT shown in Figure 2.
The second step involves creating empty matrix known 
as Working Boolean Matrix abbreviated as (WBM), and 
begin assessment from top event. Third step contains 
replacing TE in WBM with basic events (BE) and gate 
events (GE), known as Connection List (CL).
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Relation between BE and TE using OR and AND gates 
were determined through interviews with fifteen experts, 
using the indirect method. The consensus among experts 
was achieved using two-step Delphi Technique. Table S2 
(supplementary material) summarizes the steps to con-
duct the Qualitative FT Analysis.
Fourth step is to go through rows of the WBM to ex-
amine connectivity. For instance, Table 2 first row is read 
as “C, D”. BE in a row are connected to another row using 
Union operator “ ”. As such, top event is represented us-
ing Equation 1 which is simplified using Equation 2.
TE = (A∩ B∩ C) U (A∩ B)U(CD); (1)
TE = E∩ (A∩ B) U(CD). (2)
2.3. Conducting quantitative assessment fault tree
Main aim of performing quantitative FT assessment is 
to compute TE fuzzy probability of occurrence. This is 
achieved through assessing BE fuzzy probability of oc-
currence linguistically by choosing one of linguistic vari-
ables presented in Figure 2. The main steps for performing 
fuzzy quantitative fault tree analysis are:
1) Use alpha–cut (∝-cut) principle to represent the 
linguistic variable chosen.
2) Use minimal cut set identified in fuzzy qualitative 
fault tree to describe fuzzy probability of top event.
3) Perform fuzzy arithmetic operations to convert 
the “ ” and “∩” in the minimal cut set equations 
(MCS).
Verma, Srividya, and Gaonkar (2007) procedure 
is adopted which is reported by Abdelgawad (2011) 
to perform analysis. The ∝-cut of fuzzy probability of 
events connected by an “  ” gate is defined using Equa-
tion 3 for mutually exclusive events. Whereas, fuzzy 
probability of events connected by an “∩” is represent-
ed by Equation 4.
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It should be noted that S is number of events con-
nected by “∩”.
TE fuzzy probability is defuzzified using mean of 
maximum (MOM) method where MF at ∝ equals 1 rep-
resents most confident level. Purpose of calculation of 
Fuzzy Probability of TE is to determine the percentage 
of existence of TE if TE occurs. Subsequently, fuzzy im-
portance analysis is performed to identify critical causes 
using Equation 5 as per Khan and Abbasi (1999). Fuzzy 
Probability of TE computed as value of lower bound at 
∝ equals 1 plus value of the upper bound at ∝ equals 1 
divided by 2. Then, qualitative and quantitative FTS are 







= ⋅ , (5)
where: TE1 is the top event fuzzy probability, assuming that 
all root causes will happen; TE2 is the top event fuzzy prob-
ability, assuming each root cause is eliminated in turn.
Figure 2. Illustrative example of qualitative FT structure
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Upper bound = a + (b – a) · ∝;  (9)














 = 76.5%.  (12)
Fuzzy importance analysis is conducted following the 
steps described in quantitative FT analysis section to iden-
tify level of contribution of each BE to fuzzy probability 
of each mitigation strategy failure. Table S5 (supplemen-
tary material) lists fuzzy importance analysis for failure of 
Mitigation Strategies 1 and 2.
2.5. Conducting fuzzy event tree analysis
After performing quantitative FT analysis for critical risks, 
and for mitigation strategies failure, fuzzy ET analysis is 
performed considering the procedure proposed by (Ab-
delgawad & Fayek, 2011). Fuzzy arithmetic operation is 
used on fuzzy numbers to assess EMV using Equation 13 
(Verma et al., 2007).
A∝  + B∝ = [a1 + a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2, d1 + d2], (13)
where: A and B are two trapezoidal fuzzy sets; A∝  = [a1, 
d1],  B∝ = [a2, d2];
The section of the case study will further explain math-
ematically how the crisp value of EMV will be obtained as 
mentioned in the abstract.
2.6. Case study
This case considers the situation in Egyptian Real Estate 
Construction Industry after the Revolution in 2011. The case 
study is applied to fifteen real estate construction projects. 
Table S6 (supplementary material) describes the fifteen Real 
Estate Development projects participated in the case study. 
This is accomplished through development of Fuzzy Quan-
titative Risk Analysis model, considering the following stages:
Stage 1: Perform literature review and interviews us-
ing indirect method were conducted with fifteen experts. 
Experts have previous experience of twenty years in both 
risk assessment and real estate development projects to 
identify root causes for each critical risk event exists in 
2.4. Analyze mitigation strategies
Each identified mitigation strategy is then analysed by 
considering the failure of mitigation to be the top event, 
and repeating steps for stages of data collection, qualitative 
and quantitative fuzzy fault tree (Abdelgawad, 2011). For 
example, let us suggest that the real estate projects teams 
have identified two mitigation strategies: Mitigation Strat-
egy 1 named “Encourage Local and Foreign Investment” 
and Mitigation Strategy 2 named “Increase the Govern-
mental Revenues”. Project team members can investigate 
each mitigation strategy to detect its causes that leads to 
failure of mitigation strategies. Figure 3 illustrates fault 
tree to represent mitigation strategies failure, and fuzzy 
probability of BE.
Qualitative FT analysis is conducted as described earli-
er. Table S3 (supplementary material) illustrates the Work-
ing Boolean Matrix of the failure of Mitigation Strategies 
1 and 2. Subsequently, the minimal cut set equations are 
developed by converting each row’s connection with its 
related basic event as well as connects basic events with 
each row using intersection operator “∩”. BE in a row are 
connected to BE in another row using union operator “
“. By conducting this step to all rows in Table 3, the failure 
of Mitigation Strategy 1 can be represented using Equation 
6. Whereas, the failure of Mitigation Strategy 2 can be rep-
resented using Equation 7.
FM1 = A   B; (6)
FM2 = C   D   E.  (7)
After conducting qualitative FT analysis, quantitative 
FT analysis is performed using steps defined in the quan-
titative FT analysis section. Fuzzy probability of failure of 
FM1 is represented by Equation 8.
FP ( )1 FM ∝  = [(1 – FP ( )A ∝ ) · (1 – FP ( )B ∝ ))], (8)
where: FP ( )A ∝ , & FP ( )B ∝  are fuzzy probability of BE 
(A & B) represented using alpha–cut principle. Table S4 
(supplementary material) lists the Fuzzy Probability of 
FM1, and FM2 using ∝-cut principle. Upper bound and 
lower bound in Table  4 are assessed using Equations 9 
and 10, respectively. Whereas, MOM method is used to 
defuzzify the fuzzy probability of Mitigation Strategies 1 
and 2 using Equations 11 and 12, respectively.









Mitigation failure 2 (FM2) 










Figure 3. Illustrative example of FT structure
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real estate development project. Also, interviews were 
conducted to establish linguistic terms to assess occur-
rence and it was approved with experts to have five lin-
guistic terms which ranges from Very Low (VL) to Very 
High (VH). Then, the modified horizontal approach with 
interpolation technique is used to construct MF.
Stage 2: Conduct a qualitative FT Analysis to compute 
fuzzy probability of BE and to identify MCS.
Stage 3: Conduct a quantitative FT Analysis to assess 
TE probability.
Stage 4: Perform fuzzy FT analysis for mitigation 
strategies to determine the failure of selected mitigation 
strategy to TE.
Stage 5: Perform a Fuzzy ET analysis for each mitiga-
tion strategy. After performing a qualitative risk analysis, 
using Fuzzy Consensus Qualitative Risk Analysis (FC-
QRA) Framework, twenty-seven risk events were evalu-
ated and ranked. Using the Perateo Principle 20/80, the 
highest seven critical risk events that were ranked first 
in the (FCQRA) were introduced to the Fuzzy Quantita-
tive Risk Analysis model. The proposed output is to de-
termine EMV for risk events participated in case study. 
The case study is then validated through comparing the 
selling price per square meter before and after 25 th Janu-
ary 2011 Revolution to draw a complete picture about the 
current situation of the Egyptian Real Estate Construction 
Projects. These critical risks are: 1) Loss due to inflation, 
2) Currency devaluation, 3) Increase in borrowing interest 
rate, 4) Decrease in financially credible contractors’ exist-
ence, 5) Increase in raw materials prices, 6) Increase in 
labour expenses, and 7) Increase in equipment costs.
Literature review and interviews using indirect meth-
od with fifteen experts are performed to determine caus-
es of each critical risk event using the two step Delphi 
technique. The process of constructing the membership 
function was presented elsewhere (Marsh & Fayek, 2010). 
Figure 4 illustrates fault tree structure or the risk event 
named Loss due to inflation. Equation 14 illustrates the 
final Minimal Cut Set equation for the Loss due to infla-
tion Risk Event.
TE = (AC) (A∩B)∪(D∩E∩F). (14)
Experts recommended in interviews using the indi-
rect method and Delphi technique that FP (A) is High, FP 
(C) is High, FP(B) is Medium, FP (D) is Medium, FP (E) is 
Medium, and FP (F) is Low. Fuzzy probability of events is 
calculated using Equation:
FP (TE) = 1 – [(1 – FP (A)) · (1 – FP (C)) · (FP(D)) · 
(FP(E)) · (FP(F))]. (15)
Subsequently, Fuzzy FT Analysis is conducted for each 
mitigation Strategy. Figure 5 illustrates the FT structure 
of failure of Mitigation Strategy 1 and Mitigation Strategy 
2. This is done by performing qualitative fuzzy FT analy-
sis and conducting Fuzzy Quantitative Fault Tree Analy-
sis. Experts recommended that FP(A) is Medium, FP(B) 
is High, FP(C) is Medium, and FP(D) is High. Equations 
16 and 17, represent the failure of Mitigation Strategy 1, 
whereas, Equations 18 and 19 represent the failure of Miti-
gation Strategy 1.
FM1 = AB;  (16)
FP(FM1)∝ =1 – ((1 – FP(A)∝) · (1 – FP(B)∝)); (17)
FM2= BCD; (18)
FP(FM2)∝ =1 – ((1 – FP(C)∝) · (1 – FP(D)∝) ·  
(1 – FP(E)∝)). (19)
Table 1 represents ERM and EMV Calculations for risk 
“Loss due to Inflation” using mean of maximum method. 
The EMV equals the value of the middle values of the 
trapezoidal membership functions divided by 2. Its Ex-
pected Monetary Value is calculated using Equation 20.
EMV = ((0.046 + 0.024) / 2) · 100 = 3.5%.  (20)
 
Loss due to inflation 
GE 1: Withdrawal of foreign 
investment rates 
GE 3: Shortage of governmental 
revenues 








Decrease in revenues 




















Figure 4. Fault tree structure for risk event “Loss due to inflation”
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To evaluate the results obtained from case study, a 
comparative study is conducted. Interviews are held us-
ing the indirect method with the fifteen experts whom 
met before. The allowance of mitigation increased due to 
the political, economic, and social circumstances that the 
Egyptian Real Estate Sector faced after 25th Jan 2011 Revo-
lution which had strong impacts on the Egyptian Real Es-
tate sector. Fifteen Real Estate Experts provided a selling 
price for a Real Estate building before and after revolution 
based on their projects. The Real Estate building is com-
posed of ten apartments. Each apartment has an area of 
150 m2. The selling price contains the cost to complete 
finishes of apartments. After finalizing stages of the Fuzzy 
Quantitative Risk Analysis Model, EMV was computed for 
each risk event as percentage of baseline cost. Table 2 lists 
EMV for each risk, and Fuzzy Probability of Risk Events.
Table 2. EMV for different risk events
Risk event EMV percentage
Fuzzy 
probability (%)
Loss due to inflation 3.50 99.55
Currency devaluation 4.00 100.00
Increase in borrowing interest 
rate
2.05 90.80
Increase in labour expenses 1.51 99.25
Increase in equipment costs 2.55 99.20
Increase in raw materials prices 2.25 99.20




To evaluate results obtained from case study, inter-
views are held using indirect method with fifteen experts. 
Experts have twenty years of previous experience in both 
risk assessment, and real estate projects to determine the 
total construction costs for the Real Estate Building be-
fore and after the Egyptian 25th January 2011 Revolution. 
The Allowances for Mitigation, which increased due to 
the political, economic, and social circumstances that the 
Egyptian Real Estate Sector faced after 25th January 2011 
Revolution, was calculated by multiplying the percentage 
of EMV for each risk event with total construction costs 
for the Real Estate Building price to determine the pro-
posed price of the model. Table 3 lists the calculations of 
the Expected Monetary Value (EMV), Owners’ Profit and 
the Total Construction Costs of Real Estate Building/m2 
before the 25th January 2011 Egyptian Revolution using 
proposed model. As illustrated in Table 3, the EMV Value 
was computed by multiplying the percentage of EMV 
obtained from Table 2 by the total construction cost per 
square meter. The proposed Model Price was calculated by 
adding the total construction costs per square meter, the 
value of EMV per square meter, and the amount of profit 
and other real estate expenses per square meter.
Table 4 lists the computations of the Total Construc-
tion Costs of Real Estate Building after Revolution/m2, the 
Owners’ Profit, and the Actual Selling Price of the Real 
Estate Building per square meter after the 25th Jan Egyp-
tian Revolution. After that percentage error was calculated 
between the Proposed Price of model per meter square 
and the Actual Selling Price of the Real Estate Building 
per meter square after the 25th Jan Egyptian Revolution. 
Equation (21) describes the percentage error.






















Failure of mitigation 2 (FM2) “Increase local 
production” 
Figure 5. The fault tree structure for each mitigation strategy “Loss due to inflation”
Table 1. Estimated ERM and EMV for “Loss due to inflation” risk event
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%Error  = ((Proposed Model Price – Actual Selling 
Price) / Actual Selling Price) · 100, (21)
where: the Proposed Model Price is the Price obtained 
from the model for Real Estate Building per square meter, 
and the Actual Selling Price is the current Price of a Real 
Estate Building per Square Meter.
Table  5 lists the percentage error between the pro-
posed model estimated price and the actual selling price 
of a Real Estate Building per square meter for each project 
due to the political, economic, and social circumstances 
after the 25th January 2011 Egyptian Revolution.
Table 4. Computations of the actual selling price after 25th 











1 3,833.9 575.1 4,409
2 4,006.8 360.6 4,367
3 3,489.3 558.3 4,048
4 3,766.7 489.7 4,256
5 3,653.1 548.0 4,201
6 3,968.5 595.3 4,564
7 4,149.9 373.5 4,523
8 1,149.2 57.5 1,207
9 1,287.1 64.4 1,352
10 2,531.8 227.9 2,760
11 3,699.4 554.9 4,254
12 919.4 46.0 965
13 2,364.1 118.2 2,482
14 3,564.9 427.8 3,993
15 3,464.1 658.2 4,122























As listed in Table  5, the framework had an average 
percentage error of 6.98, which is acceptable. Experts 
were then asked to justify why errors existed between the 
Proposed Price of model and Selling Price of Real Es-
tate Building for the previously mentioned projects. Ex-
perts replied that the Expected Monetary Value (EMV) 
was calculated only for the seven risk events mentioned 
earlier, while projects contain more risk events, such as 
Design Fees Increase, and Increase in Governmental Re-
striction imposed to finance Construction Projects. It is 
recommended to consider the qualitatively assessed Very 
High, and High-risk events in the Fuzzy Quantitative Risk 
Table 3. Projects’ calculated EMV and owners’ profit/expenses before 25th January 2011 Egyptian Revolution





EMV value  
(LE/m2)
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Analysis Model Framework. After that the results were 
compared with the previously published works of Abdel-
gawad (2011), the average percentage error in Abdelgawad 
(2011) was found to be 13%, while in the proposed model 
was found to be 6.98%, which gives more reliability in re-
sults of proposed model. Based on interviews with fifteen 
experts in the Egyptian real estate sector, a set of recom-
mendations were made to enhance the Egyptian real estate 
sector. These recommendations include:
 – De-politicize Real Estate system and restructure it 
into one which reflects market principle.
 – Innovative financing models should be offered in for-
eign currency; for example, mortgages coupled with 
life insurance.
 – Tax incentives should be increased to encourage 
housing construction.
Conclusions
A Fuzzy Quantitative Risk Analysis model was developed 
to quantify risks existed in real estate projects. This was 
accomplished by using Fault and Event Tree. Risks were 
identified through the Fuzzy Consensus Measurement 
Framework, and is limited to independent risk events 
only. The methodology of developing the fuzzy quanti-
tative risk analysis model involved following five stages; 
Performing Data collection, Conducting Qualitative FT 
Analysis, Conducting Quantitative FT Analysis, Analys-
ing Mitigation Strategies Failure, and Conducting Fuzzy 
ET Analysis. Model is validated and case study was per-
formed using the indirect method and Delphi Technique 
to validate results obtained from model. Model provided 
an enhancement over previously published quantitative 
models by allowing the use of Fuzzy Fault and Event Tree 
to determine allowance of mitigation of identified risk 
event. Moreover, the percentage of error was computed 
between the Proposed Model Price for a real estate build-
ing per square meter and the Actual Selling Price for a real 
estate building per square meter. Furthermore, the aver-
age percentage error was computed and validated through 
comparison with previously published works. The results 
indicate the reliability of the proposed model since it pro-
vides less percentage error.
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